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Popper’s Measure of Corroboration and 𝐏 𝒉 𝒃  
Darrell P. Rowbottom 
 
This paper shows that Popper’s measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper 
also argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to 
any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper’s definition of 
degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar 
problem. 
 
1 The Corroboration Function and 𝑃 ℎ 𝑏  
2 Degrees of Testability and 𝑃 ℎ 𝑏  
 
1. The Corroboration Function and 𝐏 𝒉 𝒃  
 
Popper ([1983], p. 240) proposes the following measure of corroboration, with 
h representing a universal scientific hypothesis, e representing a report on a test of h, 
and b representing background information assumed in performing the test: 
 
1                           C ℎ, 𝑒, 𝑏 =    P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 − P 𝑒 𝑏P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 − P 𝑒ℎ 𝑏 + P 𝑒 𝑏  
 
Degree of corroboration is therefore ‘nothing but a measure of the degree to 
which a hypothesis h has been tested, and of the degree to which it has stood up to 
tests.’ (Popper [1959], p. 415). It is important theoretically since it ‘is a means of 
stating preference with respect to truth’ (Popper [1972], p. 20) and pragmatically 
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since ‘we should prefer as basis for action the best-tested theory’ (Popper [1972], p. 
22).1 
 
The probabilities are to be understood logically—with P 𝑝  defined as P 𝑝 𝑇  
where T is any tautology—as Popper ([1983], pp. 284–5) makes clear. However, 
Popper ([1959], Appendix *vii) also argues that the logical probability of any 
universal hypothesis is zero relative to any finite set of observation statements.2 Thus 
if b only contains finitely many observation statements, e.g. statements of initial 
conditions, then: 
 2                           P ℎ 𝑏 = 0 
 
Now we need only note, from the axioms of probability, that: 
 3                           P 𝑒ℎ 𝑏 = P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 P ℎ 𝑏  
 
And we may conclude that if b only contains finitely many observation 
statements then: 
 
4                           C ℎ, 𝑒, 𝑏 =   P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 − P 𝑒 𝑏P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 + P 𝑒 𝑏  
 
                                                
1 Popper’s views on the significance of corroboration underwent change throughout 
his career. For more detail, see Rowbottom [2010], Sections 2.4–2.5.3. 
2 In his own words, this is ‘probability relative to some evidence; that is to say, 
relative to a singular statement, or to a finite conjunction of singular statements’ 
(ibid.) Put simply, the idea is that infinitely many theories will be compatible with 
those observation statements and that those theories must be assigned equal 
probabilities. See Rowbottom [2010], Section 2.3. 
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In short, the central term on the denominator of (1), which is present for the 
purposes of normalization, is defunct. But (4) has various features that render it 
unsuitable as a function for measuring corroboration; chiefly, it doesn’t even provide 
a suitable ordering of how well theories have fared in response to testing. Compare 
two scenarios in which e is found to be true, the first in which P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 = 1 and P 𝑒 𝑏 = 0.1, and the second in which P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 = 0.1 and P 𝑒 𝑏 = 0.01. According 
to (4), h is equally corroborated, i.e. has a corroboration value of 9/11, in each 
scenario.3 This is patently absurd, however, since in the former scenario e is entailed 
by h and b (and discovery of ~e would have falsified the conjunct), whereas in the 
latter scenario h makes no notable contribution to predicting e in the presence of b 
(and discovery of ~e would hardly have been a blow for h and b).4 
 
But can b contain something other than a finite number of observation 
statements, and in a way such that (2) is sometimes false? First, I take it that we 
cannot possess infinitely many observation statements. Second, since (1) cannot 
concern a test of h if h is entailed by b, for the simple reason that h would make no 
predictions above and beyond b, we must conclude that P ℎ 𝑏 < 1 whenever (1) is 
applicable.5  This leaves only the possibility, third, that b can contain non-observation 
statements, e.g. universal statements such as scientific theories, which render h one of 
a finite number of alternatives and/or bear on h more favourably than other competing 
hypotheses compatible with b. Is this plausible? 
 
                                                
3 In short, (4) is sensitive only to the ratio of P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏  to P 𝑒 𝑏 . 
4 As Popper ([1983], p. 240) stated: ‘The support given by e to h becomes significant 
only when… p(e,hb) – p(e,b)>>½’.  
5 In the words of Popper ([1959], p. 418), his measure: ‘can be interpreted as a degree 
of corroboration only if e is a report on the severest tests we have been able to 
design’.	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Let b* be the subset of b that contains no observation statements. And let’s 
start by considering the scientific theories in b*. They cannot be theories inconsistent 
with h, because (2) then holds provided that h and b are individually consistent.  (For 
Popper, as for Carnap and Keynes, the logical view of probability was supposed to be 
an extension of classical logic.) So one natural way of thinking, e.g. that a theory like 
special relativity might be suggested by background knowledge of Newtonian 
mechanics, is precluded; since Newtonian mechanics is incompatible with special 
relativity, strictly speaking, b* must not contain Newtonian mechanics in any test of 
special relativity. Of course, b* may instead contain the information that the 
predictions made using Newtonian mechanics were successful (i.e. right within some 
error range) in a wide range of circumstances, i.e. for velocities low enough such that 
the gamma factor is approximately equal to one. (And this assumption of the 
approximate empirical adequacy of Newtonian mechanics in a peculiar class of 
circumstances does go beyond the finite number of observations available, i.e. b.) Yet 
this is still compatible with infinitely many theories other than h. 
 
In short, the worry is that if Popper’s argument that the probability of h 
relative to any finite number of observation statements is zero is successful, then it 
also shows that the probability of h relative to any infinite number of observation 
statements predicted by some theory (such as those implied by Newtonian mechanics) 
is zero when those only cover a limited range. View h as a curve. Consider 
observation statements—feel free to imagine if liked, as it makes no difference in the 
present context, that these are infallible—to be points on the curve. For any finite 
number of points, there are infinitely many curves that pass through. Now consider an 
infinite number of observation statements but only in a peculiar variable range. Here 
we will have a segment (or segments) of the curve h, but infinitely many curves 
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contain this segment (or these segments). Thus if the argument for the logical 
probability of h being zero works for finitely many observations, it works for 
infinitely many observations (or assumed-to-be-correct predictions) when these are in 
a limited range.6 And if they aren’t in a limited range, recall, then they will either 
entail h or conflict with h. But as we have seen above, (1) is only applicable when b 
neither entails h nor is inconsistent with h! (And if b* entails h or is inconsistent with 
h then b entails h or is inconsistent with h because b* is a subset of b.7) 
 
Perhaps there are other relevant items that could be placed in b*? One idea, for 
instance, might be to introduce assumptions related to theoretical virtues, such as ‘The 
simplest theory compatible with b is the most likely to be true’. Yet even if we 
assume that we have an appropriate measure of relative virtuosity—in this example, 
of simplicity—this strategy appears to go against the spirit of an anti-inductivist 
stance in the philosophy of science, and to question the relevance of Popper’s 
argument for (2) in the first place. If we are free to help ourselves to this kind of 
assumption, then we will find that finitely many observation statements can grant high 
probabilities to theories. ‘Prefer the simplest theories available which are compatible 
with the evidence’ may indeed be a methodological rule for Popper, but this is far 
from suggesting that simplicity is a guide to truth or falsity (and therefore that 
                                                
6 Naturally the fact that observations are only made within some error range means 
that matters are worse than suggested here; in short, we do not have access to a 
segment but only a range of possible segments within the error bars. 
7 Donald Gillies suggested, in correspondence, that if we allow h to be a model rather 
than a theory (on a syntactic view of theories), e.g. of the Moon’s motion, and then b* 
may be understood to contain theories used in its construction, e.g. Newtonian 
mechanics, in a non-problematic fashion. This is an interesting idea, but would only 
work in limited contexts where two incompatible theories (such as Newtonian 
mechanics and relativity) were not being compared. Furthermore, it would constitute 
a departure from the Popperian emphasis on theory, and not merely model, testing. 
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simplicity has anything to do, whatsoever, with corroboration, confirmation, or 
falsification). 
 
2. Degree of Testability and 𝐏 𝒉 𝒃  
 
But so what, if (1) becomes (4) and (4) is unfit for purpose? Since the 
denominator of (1) is only supposed to fulfill a normalizing role, one might maintain 
that the workhorse of the equation, namely the numerator, is of intuitive significance. 
One might add that Popper ([1983], p. 242) notes: ‘certain logarithmic formulae may 
do just as well – or better for certain purposes’. This is fair. But it is important to note 
that if (1) is abandoned for the reasons above then one should also abandon one of the 
key ideas behind its introduction, namely that degree of testability is equal to 1− P ℎ 𝑏 . Popper ([1983], p. 241) expresses this idea as follows: 
 
[I]f p(h,b)≠0, the maximum value which C(h,e,b) can attain is equal to 1 – 
p(h,b) and therefore equal to the content of h relative to b, or to its degree of 
testability. This makes the degree of testability equal to the maximal degree of 
corroboration of h, or to its ‘degree of corroborability’. 
 
Prima facie, as a result of the argument above, one might conclude that all 
universal theories are equally testable. But this would not be a happy result for 
Popper, given what he says in chapter six of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
because it would mean that two universal hypotheses were equally testable 
irrespective of their relative empirical content. Allow me to explain. 
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Popper ([1959], Chapter vi) distinguishes between two forms of content, 
empirical and logical. In his own words: 
 
I define the empirical content of a statement p as the class of its potential 
falsifiers. The logical content is defined… as the class of all non-tautological 
statements which are derivable from the statement in question. (Popper [1959], 
p. 120) 
 
Popper then relates degree of testability to degree of empirical content; and he 
argues that degrees of testability qua degrees of empirical content are crucial in 
theory-choice. As the well-known slogan goes, we should prefer bold hypotheses; 
bold, that is, precisely in so far as easily falsifiable (and therefore highly testable).8 
Consider, for example, “All swans are white” versus “All swans are white or black”. 
The former has potential falsifiers which the latter does not, and is therefore 
intuitively more testable. 
 
Popper continues by relating logical content to empirical content (and 
therefore testability), i.e. the consequence class of a statement (minus tautologies) 
with the class of its potential falsifiers, in a variety of fashions. He arrives at the 
following thesis: 
 
In comparing degrees of testability or of empirical content we shall… as a rule 
– i.e. in the case of purely empirical statements – arrive as the same results as 
in comparing logical content, or derivability relations. (Popper [1959], p. 121) 
                                                
8 Popper ([1959], p. 112) also equates degree of testability with degree of 
falsifiablilty: ‘Theories may be more, or less, severely testable; that is to say, more, or 
less, easily falsifiable’. 
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We should consider Popper’s comments about the measure 1− P ℎ 𝑏  in this 
light. As we have seen above, he equates the measure both to ‘degree of testability’ 
and ‘the content of h relative to b’ (Popper [1983], p. 241). The content in question 
here is presumably logical, in so far the measure is defined in terms of logical 
probability; i.e. 1− P ℎ 𝑏  is supposed to be a measure of the logical ‘content of h 
relative to b’ (ibid.) Thus it is plausible that Popper has the following thesis in mind: 
 
($) Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is equal to degree of 
logical content of h relative to b. 
 
Even if this is wrong, and Popper does not think ($) is true, he writes of 
‘degree of testability or of empirical content’ (Popper [1959], p. 121) and states that 1− P ℎ 𝑏  is also equal to ‘degree of testability’ (Popper [1983], p. 241).9 Hence he 
thinks that: 
 
 (£) Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is equal to  
  1− P ℎ 𝑏 . 
 
In his own words: ‘corroborability equals testability and empirical content’ 
(Popper [1983], p. 245) [emphasis in original]. But if the logical probability of “All 
swans are white or black” is equal to the logical probability of “All swans are white” 
                                                
9 It is also possible that Popper was defending a somewhat weaker theory than ($): 
 
(¥) Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is < / = / > degree of 
empirical content of h* relative to b* iff degree of logical content of h relative 
to b is < / = / > degree of logical content of h* relative to b*. 
 
Thanks to Tim Williamson for drawing this to my attention. 
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(relative to b), then the degree of empirical content of each is equal (relative to b) on 
such a view. And each is a universal hypothesis, so each does have the same logical 
probability (relative to b), namely zero, on the argument which led us to reject (1). 
Hence (£) is false if degree of empirical content is to be thought of in terms of 
potential falsifiers. (The potential falsifiers for “All swans are white or black” are a 
proper subset of the potential falsifiers for “All swans are white”.) Derivatively, ($) is 
also false if degree of logical content is defined as 1− P ℎ 𝑏 .10 
 
One could resist this conclusion only by insisting that degree of empirical 
content is a coarse-grained measure, such that degree of empirical content of h may be 
equal to degree of empirical content of h* even when the potential falsifiers of one are 
a proper subset of the potential falsifiers of the other. But to defend (£) in such a way 
leads to a dilemma. It forces renunciation either of the claim that degree of testability 
is equivalent to degree of empirical content or of the claim that different universal 
hypotheses can have different degrees of testability (given that each universal 
hypothesis has the same logical probability). Popper would not have wanted to 
suggest that “All swans are red or orange or yellow or green or blue or violet or white 
or black” is generally as good (qua testable) a hypothesis as “All swans are white”, so 
would not have grasped the second horn. To grasp the first, however, gives rise to the 
question “In virtue of what, if not greater empirical content, is ‘All swans are white’ 
more testable than ‘All swans are red or orange or… white or black’?” The difficulty 
of arriving at a satisfactory answer strongly suggests that rejecting (£), and avoiding 
the dilemma altogether, would be a preferable option. Then, to repeat, ($) must be 
rejected too. 
                                                
10 (¥) is also false if degree of logical content is defined in this way, by the same 
reasoning. Let b be b*, and let h be “All swans are white or black” and h* be “All 
swans are white”. 
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